The Freedom of the Will

As religion is the great business, for which we are created, and on which our happiness depends; and as religion consists in an intercourse between ourselves and our Maker; and so has its foundation in God's nature and ours, and in the relation that God and we stand in to each other; therefore a true knowledge of both must be needful in order to true religion. But the knowledge of ourselves consists chiefly in right apprehensions concerning those two chief faculties of our nature, the Understanding and Will. Both are very important: yet the science of the latter must be confessed to be of greatest moment; inasmuch as all virtue and religion have their seat more immediately in the will, consisting more especially in right acts and habits of this faculty. And the grand question about the Freedom of the Will, is the main point that belongs to the science of the Will. Therefore I say, the importance of this subject greatly demands the attention of Christians, and especially of Divines.

By : Jonathan Edwards (1703 - 1758)

00 - Preface 01 - I.I - Concerning the nature of the will 02 - I.II - Concerning the determination of the Will 03 - I.III - Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, etc.; and of Contingence 04 - I.IV - Of the distinction of natural and moral necessity and inability 05 - I.V - Concerning the notion of liberty, and of moral agency 06 - II.I - Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of liberty of will, consisting in the will's self-determining power 07 - II.II - Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered 08 - II.III - Whether any event whatsoever, and volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its existence 09 - II.IV - Whether volition can arise without a cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul 10 - II.V - Showing, that if the things asserted in these evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and can't help the cause of Arminian liberty; and how (this being the state of the case) Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently 11 - II.VI - Concerning the will's determining in things which are perfectly indifferent, in the view of the mind 12 - II.VII - Concerning the notion of liberty of will consisting in indifference 13 - II.VIII - Concerning the supposed liberty of the will, as opposite to all necessity 14 - II.IX - Of the connection of the acts of the will with the dictates of the understanding 15 - II.X - Volition necessarily connected with the influence of motives; with particular observations on the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings, about the freedom of the will 16 - II.XI - The evidence of God's certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents 17 - II.XII - God's certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions, as is without all necessity 18 - II.XIII - Whether we suppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with anything antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian liberty 19 - III.I - God's moral excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy 20 - III.II - The acts of the will of the human soul of Jesus Christ necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable, etc. 21 - III.III - The case of such as are given up of god to sin, and of fallen man in general, proves moral necessity and inability to be consistent with blameworthiness 22 - III.IV - Command, and obligation to obedience, consistent with moral inability to obey 23 - III.V - That sincerity of desires and endeavors, which is supposed to excuse in the nonperformance of things in themselves good, particularly considered 24 - III.VI - Liberty of indifference, not only not necessary to virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions of liberty and moral agency 25 - III.VII - Arminian notions of moral agency inconsistent with all influence of motive and inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actions 26 - IV.I - The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will, lies not in their cause, but their nature 27 - IV.II - The falseness and inconsistence of that metaphysical notion of action, and agency, which seems to be generally entertained by the defenders of the arminian doctrine concerning liberty, moral agency, etc. 28 - The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose those things which are necessary to be worthy of either Praise or Blame. 29 - IV.IV - It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of mankind, to suppose moral necessity to be consistent with praise and blame, reward and punishment 30 - IV.V - Concerning those objections, that this scheme of necessity renders all means and endeavors for the avoiding of sin, or the obtaining virtue and holiness, vain, and to no purpose; and that it makes men no more than mere machines in affairs of morality and religion 31 - IV.VI - Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it agrees with the stoical doctrine of fate, and the opinions of Mr. Hobbes 32 - IV.VII - Concerning the necessity of the divine will 33 - IV.VIII - Some further objections against the moral necessity of god's volitions considered 34 - IV.IX - Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it makes god the author of sin 35 - IV.X - Concerning sin's first entrance into the world 36 - IV.XI - Of a supposed inconsistence of these principles, with God's moral character 37 - IV.XII - Of a supposed tendency of these principles to atheism and licentiousness 38 - IV.XIII - Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvinistic doctrine is supported, that it is metaphysical and abstruse 39 - Conclusion 40 - Appendix

An Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of the Freedom of the Will which is Supposed to be Essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame or simply The Freedom of the Will, is a work by Christian reformer, theologian, and author Jonathan Edwards which uses the text of Romans 9:16 as its basis. It was first published in 1754 and examines the nature and the status of humanity's will. The book takes the classic Calvinist viewpoint on total depravity of the will and the need of humanity for God's grace in salvation.

Although written long before the modern introduction and debate over Open Theism, Edwards' work addresses many of the concerns that have been raised today over this view.

One of the authors that provoked the writing of The Freedom of the Will was Daniel Whitby. Whitby was an Arminian minister of the Church of England who was known for his anti-Calvinist viewpoint and his statement that “It is better to deny prescience [foreknowledge] than liberty.” It is this claim that Edwards attempts to answer in The Freedom of the Will. Edwards responded that a person may freely choose whatever seems good, but that whatever it is that seems good is based on an inherent predisposition that has been foreordained by God.